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Smoothed Complexity of 2-player Nash Equilibria
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Abstract
We prove that computing a Nash equilibrium of a two-player (n × n) game with payoffs
in [−1, 1] is PPAD-hard (under randomized reductions) even in the smoothed analysis setting,
smoothing with noise of constant magnitude. This gives a strong negative answer to conjectures
of Spielman and Teng [ST06] and Cheng, Deng, and Teng [CDT09].
In contrast to prior work proving PPAD-hardness after smoothing by noise of magnitude
1/poly(n) [CDT09], our smoothed complexity result is not proved via hardness of approximation
for Nash equilibria. This is by necessity, since Nash equilibria can be approximated to constant
error in quasi-polynomial time [LMM03]. Our results therefore separate smoothed complexity
and hardness of approximation for Nash equilibria in two-player games.
The key ingredient in our reduction is the use of a random zero-sum game as a gadget to
produce two-player games which remain hard even after smoothing. Our analysis crucially shows
that all Nash equilibria of random zero-sum games are far from pure (with high probability),
and that this remains true even after smoothing.
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Figure 1: The σ-neighborhood of an intractable instance x. Tractable instances are colored.
(1-a) smoothed-algorithmica: almost all instances in the σ-neighborhood are tractable, (1-b)
smoothed-complexity: very few instances in the σ-neighborhood are tractable; (1-c) hardness
of approximation: it is intractable to find a solution to any instance in the σ-neighborhood.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept in game theory. Computational complexity results
establishing the intractability of Nash equilibrium [SV06, CDT09, DGP09] suggest that players
that are even mildly computationally bounded may not be able to converge to a Nash equilibrium
in the worst case. However, the fragility of these intractable game constructions, together with
the fact that random games are tractable [BVV07], have led experts to conjecture that Nash
equilibrium should have smoothed polynomial time algorithms (e.g. [ST06] Conjecture 15, and
[CDT09] Conjecture 2). If these conjectures were true, they could explain why players in realistic
games can converge to equilibrium. In this paper, we prove that even with aggressive smoothing
perturbations of constant magnitude, finding a Nash equilibrium continues to be PPAD-complete
(under randomized reductions).
Definition 1 (X-SMOOTHED-NASH).
For a distribution X on R and problem size n, fix worst-case n×nmatricesWA,WB with entries
in [−1, 1], and let NA, NB be n×nmatrices whose entries are drawn i.i.d. from X. X-SMOOTHED-
NASH is the problem of computing, with probability1 at least 1 − 1n , a Nash equilibrium of the
game (WA +NA,WB +NB).
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem).
There exists a universal constant ǫ > 0, such that for any probability distribution X on [−ǫ, ǫ],
X-SMOOTHED-NASH is PPAD-hard under a randomized reduction.2
1.1 Complexity context: smoothed analysis vs hardness of approximation
In their 2006 survey on smoothed analysis, Spielman and Teng posed the challenge ([ST06], Open
Question 11) of exploring the connections between smoothed complexity and hardness of approxima-
tion. Concretely, they considered the example of two-player Nash equilibrium subject to σ-bounded
perturbations: Given a hard game A,B ∈ [−1, 1]n×n, perturbing each entry independently gives rise
to a new instance Aˆ, Bˆ ∈ [−1−σ, 1+σ]n×n; any Nash equilibrium of Aˆ, Bˆ is an O(σ)-approximate-
Nash equilibrium of the original game A,B. Hence, solving Nash equilibrium in the smoothed
model is at least as hard as approximating Nash [ST06, Proposition 9.12].
More generally, any hard instance x of any computational problem3 (e.g. x = (A,B) in the case
of Nash) can be in one of three states (as illustrated in Figure 1):
Smoothed-algorithmica4: Most instances in x’s neighborhood can be solved efficiently.
Smoothed-complexity: A small fraction of x’s neighborhood can be solved efficiently.
1Amplifying the success probability of smoothed algorithms is generally non-trivial (and sometimes impossible).
We note that our hardness result continues to hold even for algorithms that are only required to succeed with
probability o(1).
2Formally, we assume that there is a (single-dimensional) distribution X ′ such that Prx∼X,x′∼X′(|x − x
′| >
1/poly(n)) ≤ 1/poly(n) and X ′ can be sampled by randomized polynomial-time algorithm. This holds for any
natural smoothing distribution – e.g. truncated Gaussian or uniform. For arbitrary X such X ′ can be sampled by
a randomized algorithm which receives as input a poly(n)-size approximation of the CDF of X. For X where such
advice is necessary, our arguments show that X-SMOOTHED-NASH is PPAD-hard under randomized reductions
with polynomial-length advice.
3Naturally, the correspondence between approximation algorithms and smoothed analysis requires matching the
respective notions of approximation and smoothing perturbations.
4The name is “smoothed-algorithmica” is a cultural reference to Impagliazzo’s five worlds [Imp95] and should
not be interpreted to imply a technical connection. Formally speaking, the existence of smoothed-algorithmica yet
intractable instances is in fact consistent with any of Impagliazzo’s worlds except Algorithmica.
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Hardness-of-approximation: Finding a solution for any instance in x’s neighborhood is in-
tractable.5
Of course, as in Spielman and Teng’s proposition, hardness-of-approximation immediately rules
out efficient smoothed algorithms. But most interesting open problems in smoothed analysis admit
approximation algorithms; this limits the applicability of using hardness-of-approximation to prove
new smoothed-complexity results.
In contrast to the thriving literature on hardness of approximation and smoothed algorithms,
smoothed complexity results are rare. In this paper, we make a small step toward establishing
a theory of smoothed complexity, in the context of Spielman and Teng’s original example: two-
player Nash equilibrium subject to bounded perturbations6. While settling an open problem in
equilibrium computation, we believe that our result is just the tip of the iceberg of the theory of
smoothed complexity.
1.2 Historical context
In 1928 Von Neumann [Neu28] proved that every (finite, perfect information) zero-sum game has
an equilibrium; this result was extended to general games by Nash in 1951 [Nas51]. In 1947
Dantzig [Dan98] designed the simplex algorithm for solving linear programs (and thus also zero-
sum games); in 1964 Lemke and Howson [LH64] gave a simplex-like algorithm for general games.
Both are known to take exponential time in the worst case [KM72, SV06], but are observed to
perform much better in practice (e.g. [Sha87, ARSvS10]).
For linear programming, Khachiyan [Kha79] gave the first polynomial time algorithm in 1979,
and Spielman and Teng proved in 2004 [ST04] that the simplex algorithm has smoothed polynomial
complexity. It was natural to hope (and in fact quite widely believed, e.g. [DGP05] and [ST06,
Conjecture 9.51] respectively) that the last two results would again be extended to general games.
Surprisingly, this was ruled out by Chen, Deng, and Teng [CDT09]. Specifically, they showed
that 1/poly(n)-approximate Nash equilibrium is hard, which by Spielman and Teng’s proposition
rules out any smoothed efficient algorithms for noise magnitude 1/poly(n) (assuming PPAD is
not contained in search-RP). Chen, Deng, and Teng nevertheless conjectured that for constant
magnitude noise, two-player Nash equilibrium should have a polynomial time algorithm.
Progress on smoothed complexity of Nash with ε-noise (for small constant ε > 0) was made
by [Rub16] who proved the following hardness of approximation result: assuming the “Exponential
Time Hypothesis for PPAD7 ”, finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium requires quasipolynomial
(≈ nlog(n)) time. By Spielman and Teng’s proposition, this hardness of approximation result
also implies an analogous quasipolynomial hardness in the smoothed setting. For hardness of
approximation, the result of [Rub16] is essentially optimal due to a matching quasipolynomial time
approximation algorithm [LMM03]. This quasipolynomial time algorithm does not extend to the
smoothed case, and a large gap in the complexity of constant-smoothed Nash (quasipolynomial vs
exponential) remained open.
5Intuitively we would like to say that every instance in x’s neighborhood is intractable. Formally, however, this
may be inaccurate. In fact in the case of Nash equilibrium it is provably false! Given game (A,B), consider game
(A′, B), where A′−A is a matrix whose entries are identically equal to some small λ which encodes a Nash equilibrium
for (A,B) (and hence also for (A′, B)).
6Speilman and Teng discuss perturbing each entry by a uniform-[−σ, σ] noise, but our result holds for any bounded
i.i.d. perturbations
7The Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) for PPAD is a strengthening of PPAD * (search-)RP, which postulates
that End-of-Line (the canonical PPAD-problem) requires 2Ω˜(n) time.
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In this work, we resolve the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium with constant-magnitude
smoothing, proving that it is PPAD-complete (under randomized reductions). Compared to [Rub16],
we rule out smoothed polynomial time algorithms under a much weaker assumption (PPAD *
(search-)RP vs ETH for PPAD).8 Alternatively, comparing both results under the same assump-
tion, ETH for PPAD, we prove a much stronger lower bound on the running time (2poly(n) vs
≈ nlog(n))9. Finally, another advantage of our result compared to [Rub16] is that our proof is much
simpler, and in particular does not require any PCP-like machinery.
1.3 Intuition and roadmap
We will reduce 1/poly(n)-approximate Nash to X-SMOOTHED-NASH. The starting point of our
reduction is the following simple idea: for any mixed strategies (x, y) which are spread over a large
number of actions, the noise from the smoothing averages out. In contrast, if we start with an off-
the-shelf PPAD-hard game (P,Q) and amplify it by simple repetition (formally, tensor the payoff
matrices P,Q with the all ones matrix J), the signal from P,Q will remain strong even with respect
to well-spread strategies. This means that given a well-spread (in a sense we make precise later)
Nash equilibrium x, y for a tensored, smoothed game (P ⊗ J +NP , Q⊗ J +NQ), we can recover a
1/poly(n)-approximate equilibrium for (P,Q).
There is one major problem with the reduction suggested above: an oracle for X-SMOOTHED-
NASH might not return a well-spread equilibrium (x, y). Our goal henceforth is to modify this
construction to create a game where no Nash equilibrium has strategies concentrated on a small
number of actions. Note that pure or even small-support equilibria don’t break only our proof
approach: they can be found efficiently by brute-force enumeration, so such games cannot be hard.
Which games have no strategies concentrated on a small number of actions? At one extreme,
if the entries of the payoff matrices are entirely i.i.d. (from any continuous distribution), a folklore
result states that the game has a pure equilibrium with probability approaching 1 − 1/e. This
creates a significant problem: we have to work with games where the entries are smoothed with
independent noise – if such games turn out also to have pure or small-support strategies, then they
cannot be hard.
In contrast to i.i.d. random games, we observe that random zero-sum games tend to have only
well spread equilibria [Rob06, Jon04]. For example, they are exponentially unlikely to have a
pure equilibrium; intuitively, if a pure strategy profile is exceptionally good for one player, it is
likely exceptionally bad for the other. In the context of our proof approach, another advantage of
random zero-sum games is that with respect to well-spread mixed strategies, they will also average
out. That is, even if we add a random zero-sum game Z, we can still hope to recover a 1/poly(n)
Nash equilibrium for (P,Q) from a well-spread equilibrium for (P ⊗ J +Z +NP , Q⊗ J −Z +NQ).
Our main technical task is to show that adding a random zero-sum game in this fashion produces
a game with only well-spread Nash equilibria, even in the presence of the i.i.d. smoothing NA, NB .
Our first step is to rule out all small support equilibria. In Section 4 we formalize the
above intuition, showing that every equilibrium of a random zero-sum game has large supports, even
when we add constant-magnitude perturbations. For technical reasons, our proof in this section
works for random zero-sum games whose entries are drawn uniformly from discrete {−1, 1}.
8As discussed above, this holds in the case that X is approximately polynomial-time sampleable – otherwise we
require the assumption PPAD * (search-)RP/poly.
9In fact, under the plausible hypothesis that the true complexity of End-of-Line (the canonical PPAD-problem) is
≈ 2n
α
for some constant 0 < α ≤ 1/2, our result implies the qualitatively-same strong lower bound, and the result of
[Rub16] completely breaks.
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Our second step is to obtain a robust version of no-small-support. Namely, building on
the fact every equilibrium has large support, in Section 5 we prove that it must be well-spread
(formally, the mixed strategies have small || · ||2 norm). For technical reasons, our proof in this
section works for random zero-sum games whose entries are drawn uniformly from continuous
[−1, 1]. Fortunately, we can make both of proofs work simultaneously by taking the sum of a
{−1, 1} and a [−1, 1] zero-sum games.
Putting it all together. To summarize, our final construction of hard instance is given by:
A := P ⊗ J + Z{−1,1} + Z[−1,1]
B := Q⊗ J︸ ︷︷ ︸
PPAD-hard
− Z{−1,1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
large support
− Z[−1,1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
well-spread
,
where Z{−1,1}, Z[−1,1] are random matrices with i.i.d. entries uniformly sampled from {−1, 1}
and [−1, 1] (respectively), and (P,Q) is a PPAD-hard bimatrix game, and J is an (appropriate-
dimension) all-ones matrix.
In Section 3, we show that when the Nash equilibrium strategies are well-spread, the random
zero-sum games and random perturbations average out. Thanks to the amplification, the signal
from (P,Q) remains sufficiently strong. Thus, we can map any Nash equilibrium of (A,B) to a
1/poly(n)-approximate Nash equilibrium of (P,Q). By [CDT09] this suffices to establish PPAD-
hardness (under randomized reductions).
Remark (Inverse-polynomial signal-to-noise ratio).
Interestingly, the amplification of (P,Q) by repetition is so powerful that our proof would go
through even if we were to multiply P and Q by an inverse-polynomial small scalar.10 In this
sense, we show that Nash remains intractable even subject to noise (zero-sum + i.i.d.) that is
polynomially larger than the worst-case signal.
1.4 Additional related work
Subsequent to the seminal works of [DGP09, CDT09] which showed that Nash equilibrium is
PPAD-complete, there has been an active line of work on algorithms with provable guarantees
for exact or approximate equilibria in special cases including: sparse games [Bar18], low-rank
games [KT10, AGMS11], positive-semidefinite games [ALSV13], anonymous games [DP15, CDS17],
tree
games [EGG06, BLP15, OI16]. Complexity limitations for most of these special cases known as
well: sparse games [CDT06, LS18], low-rank games [Meh14], anonymous games [CDO15], and tree
games [DFS20].
More relevant to the topic of smoothed analysis, it is known that when equilibria do not fluctuate
when the input is perturbed, finding equilibria can be done efficiently [BB17]. Furthermore, a game
chosen at random is likely to have easy-to-find equilibria [BVV07].
Spielman and Teng [ST06, Open Question 11] ask whether there is a relation between approxi-
mation hardness and smoothed lower bounds: the former implies the latter, but little else is known
regarding smoothed lower bounds. For the case of integer linear programs over the unit cube, Beier
and Vo¨cking [BV06] show that a problem has polynomial smoothed complexity if and only if it
admits a pseudo-polynomial algorithm. Note that a pseudo-polynomial algorithm can be used to
approximate by truncating input numbers. For other problems, we are aware of a few papers that
argue smoothed complexity lower bounds via approximation hardness, e.g. [CDT09, HT07, KN07].
10We only informally state the result to prioritize simplicity, but it will be evident by the remarks in Section 2.1.
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2 Preliminaries
We formally define the problem here, and present some remarks. Let n be a positive integer. We
let ei ∈ Rn be the ith indicator vector. Let A,B ∈ Rn×n be payoff matrices (corresponding to
Alice and Bob). We define a Nash equilibrium to be vectors x,y ∈ Rn≥0, called mixed strategies,
such that ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = 1 we have that
x⊺Ay = max
i∈[n]
e
⊺
iAy
x⊺By = max
i∈[n]
x⊺Bei.
We say that an equilibrium is ǫ-approximate if
x⊺Ay + ǫ ≥ max
i∈[n]
e
⊺
iAy
x⊺By + ǫ ≥ max
i∈[n]
x⊺Bei.
For a given equilibrium x,y (often clear from context), we let A00 and B00 be the restrictions
of A and B to supp(x)×supp(y), respectively. We let A10 and B10 be the restrictions to supp(x)×
supp(y), etc. Computing any Nash equilibrium, even n−O(1)-approximate, is known to be PPAD-
complete [CDT09]:
Theorem 2 ([CDT09]). For all c > 0, computing an n−c-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n×n
bimatrix game with entries bounded in [0, 1] is PPAD-complete.
2.1 Remarks on the reduction
The reduction, presented in Section 3, will ultimately take a hard instance of Theorem 2 and trans-
form it into a instance of X-SMOOTHED-NASH, for suitable distributions X. By the nature of
the reduction, if one applies the same reduction with a wider hardness-of-approximation guarantee,
one can deduce that for a suitable constant c > 0, it is PPAD-hard under a randomized reduction
to find a n−c-approximate equilibrium of X-SMOOTHED-NASH (see, e.g., Eq. 5). This has two
interesting implications.
First, this means that if you truncate the output of the distribution X, as well as the uniform
distribution sampled in the reduction, toO(log n) bits, it is still PPAD-hard to find an (approximate)
equilibrium for the resulting instance . In particular, the smoothed complexity result is robust to
the underlying arithmetic representation of the payoffs.
Second, scaling down the hard instance of Theorem 2 by a small polynomial still maintains an
n−O(1) hardness-of-approximation guarantee. Thus, as mentioned in the introduction, the reduction
implies that Nash remains intractable even subject to noise (zero-sum + i.i.d.) that is polynomially
larger than the worst-case signal.
2.2 Concentration for random bilinear forms
We introduce here the following concentration bound which is useful in our result.
Definition 2 (Subgaussian random variable). A R-valued random variable X is subgaussian with
variance proxy s2 > 0 if for all t > 0, E exp(tX) ≤ exp(s2t2/2). Note that if X ∈ [−b, b] for some
b > 0 with probability 1, then X is subgaussian with variance proxy b2/4.
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Lemma 3. Let A be an n× n matrix with independent subgaussian entries with variance proxy at
most 1. For all u > 0, with probability at least 1 − exp(−u2), all x,y ∈ Rn with ‖x‖2 = ‖y‖2 = 1
have
x⊤Ay ≤ O(
√
log n+ u)(‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1) .
As a corollary, with the same probability, all x,y ∈ Rn with ‖x‖1, ‖y‖1 ≤ 1 have
x⊤Ay ≤ O(
√
log n+ u)(‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2) .
The proof of this lemma is deferred to the Appendix.
3 The Reduction, and Proof of Theorem 1
First, we show in Section 3.1 the reduction in the case that the noise distribution X is symmetric,
i.e., the probability of sampling a and −a is identical for all a > 0. We then show in Section 3.2 a
slight modification which works for any distribution X.
3.1 The symmetric case
Let ǫ > 0 be a sufficiently small constant. Let X be any symmetric distribution on [−ǫ, ǫ]. Let n, b
be positive integers such that b divides n, b = n0.01, and n is sufficiently large. We divide [n] into
b blocks which we label Ii := {(i − 1)nb + 1, (i − 1)nb + 2, . . . , i · nb }. We let ℓ := n/b = n0.99 denote
the block length.
Let P,Q ∈ Rb×b be payoff matrices. Let Jℓ denote the ℓ × ℓ all 1’s matrix. Let Z0 be an
n × n matrix whose entries are sampled i.i.d. from the Rademacher distribution (i.e., the uniform
distribution on {−1, 1}). Let Z1 be an n × n matrix whose entries are sampled i.i.d. from the
uniform distribution on [−1, 1]. Let Aǫ, Bǫ be n× n matrices whose entries are i.i.d. sampled from
X (all distributions independent).11
A := P ⊗ Jℓ + Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ
B := Q⊗ Jℓ − Z0 − Z1 +Bǫ,
where P ⊗ Jℓ denotes the n× n matrix, where every entries in block Ii × Ij is Pi,j .
We present here here the final result of this paper. We will refer without proof to a bound on
the norm of the equilibrium strategy vectors, and we defer its proof to the rest of the paper, namely
Sections 4 and 5. This norm bound is the technical heart of this paper, and the present section
illustrates its strength.
We seek to show that equilibria of the reduced game (A,B) can be used to efficient pro-
duce approximate equilibria to the game (P,Q), which we have assumed is hard to approximate.
Let (x,y) be an equilibrium of (A,B). We will show in Section 5 that, with high probability,
‖x‖2, ‖y‖2 ≤ n−0.2, even when ǫ is a constant. Note that b = n0.01 is the dimension of the input
game (P,Q). Define (xˆ, yˆ) to be distributions over [b] such that for all i ∈ [n]
xˆi =
∑
i′∈Ii
xi′ , yˆi =
∑
i′∈Ii
yi′ .
11The to meet the definition of X-SMOOTHED-NASH, which specifies that the hard game must have entries
between [−1, 1], we can scale the construction (and thus X) by a factor of 3.
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Theorem 4. With probability 1 − n−2, we have that (xˆ, yˆ) is a b−19-approximate equilibrium of
(P,Q).
Proof. We claim that (xˆ, yˆ) is an b−19 = n−0.19-approximate equilibrium of (P,Q) with high prob-
ability. Assume not, without loss of generality, Alice would benefit from deviating from xˆ. That
is, there exists i ∈ [b] such that
xˆ⊺P yˆ ≤ e⊺iP yˆ − b−19. (1)
Define uS to be the uniform probability vector on support S, then, the above is equivalent to
x⊺(P ⊗ Jℓ)y ≤ u⊺Ii(P ⊗ Jℓ)y − b−19. (2)
By Lemma 3, we may assume that the concentration inequality holds for 12+ǫ(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ), then
we know that
|x⊺(Z0 +Aǫ)y| ≤ O(
√
log n n−0.2) (3)
|u⊺Ii(Z0 +Aǫ)y| ≤ O(
√
log n n−0.2) (4)
Combining Eqs. 2,3, and 4 we get
x⊺Ay ≤ u⊺IiAy − b−19 +O(
√
log n n−0.2) < u⊺IiAy. (5)
since b = n0.01. This contradicts that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of (A,B).
By a similar argument, Bob does not wish to deviate with high probability. Therefore, (xˆ, yˆ)
is a b−19-approximate Nash equilibrium of (P,Q).
Since finding a b−19-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard [CDT09] when P and Q have
constant sized entries, finding the smoothed equilibrium of (A,B) is PPAD-hard. Since the proofs
of Sections 4 and 5 hold when X is supported on [−ǫ, ǫ] for ǫ > 0 constant, this is an instance of
X-SMOOTHED NASH, and therefore concludes the proof of Theorem 1 when X is a symmetric
distribution.
3.2 General X
Let X be any distribution supported on [−ǫ/2, ǫ/2]. Let Y := X −X ′ be the distribution on [−ǫ, ǫ]
which takes two i.i.d. samples from X and subtracts them. Note that Y is a symmetric distribution,
so by the previous section we have that Y -SMOOTHED NASH is hard. In particular, it is hard to
find an equilibrium from the distribution
A := P ⊗ Jℓ + Z0 + Z1 +AY
B := Q⊗ Jℓ − Z0 − Z1 +BY ,
whereAY and BY are matrix whose entries are i.i.d. samples from Y . We can rewrite AY = AX−A′X
and BY = BX − B′X , where AX , A′X , BX , B′X are all i.i.d. matrix samples from X. Thus, the
distribution can be rewritten as
A := (P ⊗ Jℓ + Z0 + Z1 −A′X) +AX
B := (Q⊗ Jℓ − Z0 − Z1 −B′X) +BX ,
This is an instance of X-SMOOTHED NASH, and we conclude Theorem 1 for arbitrary X, losing
a factor 2 on ǫ.
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4 Equilibria Have Large Support
In this section and the following, we will show the bound on ‖x‖2, ‖y‖2 which was required in the
proof of Theorem 1. We first show that the support of the equilibria is large with high probability.
Then, in Section 5, use this to argue that the weight must be sufficiently spread. The main result
of this section is the following lemma.
Lemma 5. With probability 1 − n−3, for every Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B), we have that
|supp(x)| = |supp(y)| > n0.96.
We prove this result using methods partially inspired by [Jon04]. Observe that a Nash equilib-
rium of (A,B) requires that
x⊺Ay ≥ e⊺iAy for all i ∈ [n]
x⊺By ≥ x⊺Bej for all j ∈ [n]
=⇒ x⊺(A+B)y ≥ e⊺iAy + x⊺Bej for all i, j ∈ [n]. (6)
We seek to show that Eq. 6 cannot hold when the support x,y is sufficiently small.12 To do that,
we propose a “benchmark” to which both the LHS and the maximum value of the RHS of Eq. 6 are
comparable to. To define this benchmark, we begin by introducing a notion of robust partition of
the strategy vectors. Consider x ∈ Rn such that ‖x‖1 = 1. Let L = ⌈log2 n⌉/2100. Let D = 22
500
.
Let E1, . . . , EL be intervals such that Ei = (D
−i,D−(i−1)] for all i < L and EL = [0,D−(L−1)]. Let
x = x(1) + · · · + x(L) such that
x
(i)
j =
{
xj xj ∈ Ei
0 otherwise
We say that x(i) is sparse if it has at most L nonzero coordinates; otherwise we say x(i) is
dense. Let xsparse be the sum of the sparse x
(i)’s and xdense be the sum of the dense ones. Note
that x = xsparse + xdense. Now define the following quantity
β(x) =
√
log n‖xdense‖2 + ‖xsparse‖1.
We call β(x) the benchmark for x. This quantity will appear in a number of concentration/anti-
concentration inequalities. First, we show a key anticoncentration inequality concerning this robust
partition.
Lemma 6. Assume that X is the uniform distribution on {−1, 1} (i.e., the Rademacher distribu-
tion). There exists a universal constant c > 0 with the following property: For all x ∈ Rn such that
‖x‖1 = 1, with probability at least n−0.001 over v ∼ Xn
〈v,x〉 ≥ cβ(x).
The proof of the above lemma is deferred to the Appendix. The following concentration bound
will also be of use. For any distribution X, we let Xn×n denote the distribution of n× n matrices
with entries i.i.d. samples from X.
Claim 7. Let X be any distribution on [−1, 1]. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that for
all n ≥ 0, with probability 1− 1/n4 over M ∼ Xn×n, for all x,y ∈ Rn such that ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = 1,
we have that
|x⊺My| ≤ C · (β(x) + β(y)).
12In the case of [Jon04], which considers zero-sum games, the LHS of (6) is equal to 0, so it suffices to bound the
probability that the RHS is positive for some i and j.
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Proof. Apply Lemma 3 to M with u =
√
3 log n. Then, there is a universal constant C ′ such that
with probability 1− 1/n3, for all x,y with ℓ1 norm 1,
|x⊺denseMydense| ≤ C ′
√
log n(‖xdense‖2 + ‖ydense‖2).
Thus, since the entries of M have absolute value at most 1,
|x⊺My| ≤ |x⊺Mysparse|+ |x⊺sparseMydense|+ |x⊺denseMydense|
≤ ‖ysparse‖1 + ‖xsparse‖1 + C ′
√
log n(‖xdense‖2 + ‖ydense‖2)
≤ max(C ′, 1)(β(x) + β(y)).
Thus, we can set C = max(C ′, 1).
These lemmas will allow us to prove Lemma 5. We present first the following facts about
equilibria in random games.
Proposition 8. With probability 1, for nonempty S, T ⊂ [n] there is at most one Nash equilibrium
(x,y) of (A,B) with S = supp(x) and T = supp(y). Further, with probability 1 all such equilibria
have |S| = |T |.
Proof. Fix nonempty S, T ⊂ [n]. Fix i0 ∈ S. Assume without loss of generality that |S| ≥ |T |.
Denote A00 as the sub-matrix of A restricted to rows indexed by S and columns indexed by T . For
any equilibrium (x,y) with supports S and T , we have that x⊺Ay = e⊺iA
00y for all i ∈ S, when
treating x and y as |S|- and |T |-dimensional vectors, respectively. Therefore,
(ei − ei0)⊺A00y = 0 for all i ∈ S \ {i0}. (7)
Since all the entries of A00 are drawn independently from a continuous distribution, the null space
of the linear system (7) has dimension max(|T | − |S| + 1, 0) ≤ 1 with probability 1. Since y 6= 0
the null space must have dimension exactly 1. Thus, |T | − |S|+1 ≥ 1, which implies that |S| = |T |
and the solution y is unique, as there can be at most one vector in a 1-dimensional subspace with
coordinates summing to one. By a similar argument x is also unique.
Since there are only finitely many choices of S and T , with probability 1 the proposition holds
for all Nash equilibria simultaneously.
With probability 1, all equilibria of A and B will have the same support size, and further, for
every pair of possible supports S ⊂ [n] and T ⊂ [n] there is at most one equilibrium. We let
x,y ∈ Rn denote the probability distributions of strategies in this equilibrium.
We can now prove Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 5. Assume (which happens with probability 1− n−4) that the event described in
Claim 7 occurs for M = 12ǫ(Aǫ + Bǫ). Fix S, T ⊂ [n] with |S|, |T | < ℓ/10. We seek to show that
with probability at most 2−ℓ, S and T can be the support of a Nash equilibrium. By Proposition 8,
we can assume that |S| = |T |.
Also by Proposition 8, with probability 1, there is at most one equilibrium (x,y) on the game
(A00, B00) with full support. Note that x and y, if they exist, are independent of the entries of A
and B outside of S×T . As mentioned earlier in the section, in order for the equilibrium to extend,
the Ineq. 6 must hold:
x⊺(A+B)y ≥ e⊺iAy + x⊺Bej for all i, j ∈ [n].
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Say that i ∈ [n] \ S is S-good if e⊺i (Z0 + Z1 + Aǫ)y > cβ(y). By Lemma 6, we know that
e
⊺
iZ1y > cβ(y) with probability at least n
−0.001. Independently, we have that e⊺i (Z0 + Aǫ)y ≥ 0
with probability at least 1/2 (since Z0 + Aǫ is a mean-zero matrix distribution). Therefore, both
this event happens with probability at least n−0.001/2 ≥ n−0.01.
Likewise, say that j ∈ [n]\T is T -good if x⊺(−Z0−Z1−Bǫ)ej > cβ(x). By the same argument,
this also happens with probability at least n−0.01 . Furthermore, the S-good events and T -good
events are independent of each other because each event is based on a disjoint subset of entriesZ
from Z0 and Z1.
Since x and y are probability distributions, there exists i0 ∈ S and j0 ∈ T such that e⊺i0(P ⊗
Jℓ)y ≥ x⊺(P ⊗ Jℓ)y and x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ)ej0 ≥ x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ)y. Let i′, j′ ∈ [b] be the indices of the blocks
such that i0 ∈ Ii′ and j0 ∈ Ij′ . Since we assume that |S|, |T | ≤ ℓ/10, we have that Ii′ \S and Ij′ \T
both have size at least 9ℓ/10.
Now, for any good i ∈ Ii′ \ S and good j ∈ Ij′ \ T , we have
x⊺(A+B)y = x⊺(P ⊗ Jℓ)y + x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ)y + x⊺(Aǫ +Bǫ)y
≤ e⊺i0(P ⊗ Jℓ)y + x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ)ej0 + 2Cǫ(β(x) + β(y))
= e⊺i (P ⊗ Jℓ)y + x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ)ej + 2Cǫ(β(x) + β(y))
< e⊺i (P ⊗ Jℓ)y + x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ)ej + c(β(x) + β(y)) (ǫ < 2c/C)
< e⊺i (P ⊗ Jℓ + Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y + x⊺(Q⊗ Jℓ − Z0 − Z1 +Bǫ)ej
= e⊺iAy + x
⊺By,
which contradicts Ineq. 6. Thus, there must either be no good i ∈ Ii′ \ S or there is no good
j ∈ Ij′ \ T . This happens with probability at most
2
(
1− n−0.01)9ℓ/10 ≤ 2e−(0.9)ℓ/n0.01 ≤ e−n0.97 ,
where we use in the last inequality that n is sufficiently large. The number of pairs S, T with
support at most n0.96 is at most (
n
≤ n0.96
)2
≤ n2n0.96 .
Note that for n sufficiently large, n2n
0.96
e−n0.97 ≪ n−4. Thus, all equilibria have support size
greater than n0.96 with probability at least 1− 2n−4 ≥ 1− n−3.
5 Equilibria Have Small ℓ2 norm
Towards showing the missing bound in the proof of Theorem 1, the previous section showed that
with high probability, any equilibrium must have polynomially large support. We complete here
the proof of the norm bound, which in turn completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 9. With probability 1 − 20n−3, for every Nash equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B), we have that
‖x‖2, ‖y‖2 ≤ n−0.2.
We must, however, begin this section with a few technical results. We will need the following
theorem, which is derived from the fact that the VC-dimension of the set of halfspaces in Rd has
VC-dimension at most d+1 – that is, the VC-dimension of {x 7→ 1[〈x,v〉+ t ≥ 0] : v ∈ Rd, t ∈ R}
is at most d+ 1. (See e.g. [Wai19], Example 4.21.)
10
Theorem 10 (Multivariate Glivenko-Cantelli). Let X be a random vector in Rd and let X1, . . . ,Xn
be independent copies of X. For all δ ∈ [0, 1], with probability 1− δ,
sup
v∈Rd,t∈R
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
1[〈Xi,v〉 ≥ t]− Pr
X
(〈X,v〉 ≥ t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ O
(√
d
n
+
√
log(1/δ)
n
)
.
We also need the following Littlewood-Offord-type theorem.
Theorem 11 ([RV15], Theorem 1.2). Let X1, . . . ,Xn be real-valued independent random variables
with densities almost everywhere bounded by K. Let a1, . . . , an ∈ R with
∑
i≤n a
2
i = 1. Then the
density of
∑
i≤n aiXi is bounded by
√
2K almost everywhere.
The following lemma, which we obtain as a corollary of these two theorems, allows us to argue
that the entries of a product of a random matrix with a fixed vector are relatively spread out.
Lemma 12. Let n, d be positive integers. Let X be an R-valued random variable with density
bounded by K. Let g1 . . . ,gn be independent random vectors in Rd whose coordinates are indepen-
dent copies of X. With probability 1− δ, for all unit vectors v ∈ Rd and all intervals [a, b] ⊂ R,
1
n
n∑
i=1
1[〈gi,v〉 ∈ [a, b]] ≤
√
2K|a− b|+O
(√
d
n
+
√
log(1/δ)
n
)
.
Proof. By Theorem 10, with probability at least 1 − δ, the CDFs of 〈g,v〉 and the empirical
distribution of 〈gi,v〉 have distance at most O
(√
d
n +
√
log(1/δ)
n
)
, for all v ∈ Rd. So it suffices to
show that for every unit v ∈ Rd, Prg(〈g,v〉 ∈ [a, b]) ≤
√
2K|a− b|. This follows immediately from
Theorem 11.
Finally, this lemma allows us to prove the following claim.
Claim 13. Let X be a distribution on [−1, 1] whose probability density is at most 100 everywhere.
Let M ∼ Xn×n. With probability 1 − n−4, for every S, T ⊂ [n] with |S| ≥ n0.95 and |T | ≤ n0.85,
there exists disjoint S1, S2 ⊂ S of size at least n0.94 each such that for all unit vectors y ∈ Rn with
support in T there exists r ∈ R such that
e
⊺
i1
My ≥ r + n−0.07 for all i1 ∈ S1
e
⊺
i2
My ≤ r for all i2 ∈ S2.
Proof. For every T ⊂ [n] of size at most n0.85, apply Lemma 12 to the rows of M restricted to
the columns of T (so d = |T | ≤ n0.85) with δ = e−n0.86 . Thus, with probability 1 − e−n0.86 , for
every unit vector y ∈ Rd supported on T and every interval [a, b] of length n−0.06/10, the number
of i ∈ [n] such that e⊺iMy ∈ [a, b] is at most
n
[
100
√
2|a− b|+O
(√
d
n
+
√
log(1/δ)
n
)]
= O(n0.94)
choices of i ∈ [n] for which e⊺iAy falls in that interval. Since |S| ≥ n0.95, this implies there exist
r ∈ R, and disjoint S1, S2 ⊂ S of size at least n0.94 such that
e
⊺
i1
My ≥ r + n
−0.06
10
≥ r + n−0.07 for all i1 ∈ S1
e
⊺
i2
My ≤ r for all i2 ∈ S2.
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Taking the union bound over all choices of T we get this all happens with probability at most
1−
(
n
≤ n0.85
)
e−n
0.86 ≥ 1− e−n0.85 ≥ 1− n−4.
We can now prove Lemma 9.
Proof of Lemma 9. With probability 1 − n−3, by Lemma 5, for every equilibrium (x,y) of (A,B)
with support S and T , respectively, we have that |S| = |T | ≥ n0.96. Since there are n0.01 blocks.
By the pigeonhole principle there exists i0, j0 ∈ [b] such that |S ∩ Ii0 |, |T ∩ Ij0 | ≥ n0.95.
With probability 1 − 2n−4, Claim 13 holds with for both M = 12+ǫ(Z0 + Z1 + Aǫ) and M =
1
2+ǫ(−Z0−Z1+Bǫ). Further, with probability at least 1−2n−3, Lemma 3 holds for M = 12+ǫ(Z0+
Z1 +Aǫ) and M =
1
2+ǫ(−Z0 − Z1 +Bǫ) with u =
√
3 log n.
We seek to show that any large-support equilibrium also has small ℓ2 norm. Assume for sake of
contradiction (and without loss of generality) that ‖y‖2 ≥ n−0.2. Let S′ = S ∩ Ii0 and T ′ be the set
of coordinates of y which are greater than n−0.85. Clearly |T ′| ≤ n0.85. Let yT ′ be the coordinates
of y supported on T ′ and y¯T ′ be the remaining coordinates. Observe that
‖y¯T ′‖22 ≤ n · (n−0.85)2 = n−0.7 ≤
‖y‖22
2
(8)
‖yT ′‖22 = ‖y‖22 − ‖y¯T ′‖22 ≥
‖y‖22
2
. (9)
Applying Claim 13 forM = 12+ǫ(Z0+Z1+Aǫ) and the sets S
′, T ′ and the vector y′ := yT ′‖yT ′‖2 , there
exists S′1, S′2 ∈ S′ and r ∈ R such that (scaling by 2 + ǫ ≥ 1)
e
⊺
i1
(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y
′ ≥ r + n−0.07 for all i1 ∈ S′1
e
⊺
i2
(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y
′ ≤ r for all i2 ∈ S′2.
Thus,
u
⊺
S′1
(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y
′ ≥ r + n−0.07
u
⊺
S′2
(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y
′ ≤ r
=⇒ (uS′1 − uS′2)
⊺(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y
′ ≥ n−0.07.
Applying (9),
(uS′1 − uS′2)
⊺(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)yT ′ ≥ n−0.07‖y‖2/2 ≥ n−0.28.
Since Lemma 3 holds for M = 12+ǫ(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ), we have that
(uS′1 − uS′2)
⊺(Z0 + Z1 +Aǫ)y¯T ′ ≥ −(2 + ǫ)C ′
√
log n(‖uS′1 − uS′2‖2 + ‖y¯T ′‖2)
≥ −n0.01max(
√
2n−0.94/2, n−0.7/2)
≥ −n−0.34.
Therefore, since y = yT ′ + y¯T ′
(uS′1 − uS′2)
⊺(Z0 +Aǫ)y ≥ n−0.28 − n−0.34 ≥ n−0.29.
Since S′1 and S
′
2 are subsets of the same block, we have that uS′1(P ⊗Jℓ) = uS′2(P ⊗Jℓ). Therefore,
(uS′1 − uS′2)
⊺Ay ≥ n−0.29.
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But, since S′1 and S
′
2 are subsets of the support of x, we know that
(uS′1 − uS′2)
⊺Ay = 0,
thus we have a contradiction. Therefore, ‖y‖2 ≤ n−0.2. By a similar argument (also with probability
1− 5n−3, ‖x‖2 ≤ n−0.2, as desired. By the union bound, the total probability of success is at least
1− 20n−3 ≥ 1− n−2.
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A Proof of Lemma 3
To prove this lemma, we rely on the following powerful comparison inequality of Talagrand.
Theorem 14 (Talagrand’s comparison inequality, high-probability version. [Ver18], Exercise
8.6.5). Suppose that {Xs}s∈S is a collection of R-valued random variables, indexed by some S ⊆ Rn,
0 /∈ S. Suppose that for all s, t ∈ S, Xs −Xt is subgaussian with variance proxy at most ‖s− t‖2.
There is a universal constant C > 0 such that for all u > 0, with probability at least 1− exp(−u2),
sup
s∈S
Xs ≤ C
(
E
g∼N (0,I)
sup
s∈S
〈g, s〉 + u · sup
s∈S
‖s‖2
)
.
Now we can prove Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Let A be an n×n matrix with independent subgaussian entries with variance proxy at
most 1. For all u > 0, with probability at least 1 − exp(−u2), all x,y ∈ Rn with ‖x‖2 = ‖y‖2 = 1
have
x⊤Ay ≤ O(
√
log n+ u)(‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1) .
As a corollary, with the same probability, all x,y ∈ Rn with ‖x‖1, ‖y‖1 ≤ 1 have
x⊤Ay ≤ O(
√
log n+ u)(‖x‖2 + ‖y‖2) .
Proof. Consider for each x,y ∈ Rn the random variable x⊤Ay/(‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1). Since the entries of
A are subgaussian with variance proxy 1, there is a universal C > 0 such that 〈U,A〉 is subgaussian
with variance proxy C‖U‖2F , where ‖ · ‖F is the Frobenius norm, for any n × n matrix U . Hence,
for x,y,x′,y′ ∈ Rn,
x⊤Ay
‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 −
(x′)⊤Ay′
‖x′‖1 + ‖y′‖1
is subgaussian with variance proxy C‖xy⊤/(‖x‖1+‖y‖1)− (x′)(y′)⊤/(‖x′‖1+‖y′‖1)‖2F . We claim
that ∥∥∥∥ xy⊤‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 − (x
′)(y′)⊤
‖x′‖1 + ‖y′‖1
∥∥∥∥2
F
≤
∥∥∥∥ (x,y)‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 − (x
′,y′)
‖x′‖1 + ‖y′‖1
∥∥∥∥2
2
,
where (x,y) denotes the concatenation of x and y to a 2n-length vector. To see this, recalling that
‖x‖2 = ‖y‖2 = ‖x′‖2 = ‖y′‖2 = 1, let m = ‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 and m′ = ‖x′‖1 + ‖y′‖1 and expand both
sides, it is equivalent to prove
m2 + (m′)2 − 2m(m′)〈x,x′〉〈y,y′〉
m2(m′)2
≤ 2m
2 + 2(m′)2 − 2m(m′)〈x,x′〉 − 2m(m′)〈y,y′〉
m2(m′)2
.
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This is equivalent to
1
m2
+
1
(m′)2
− 2〈x,x
′〉+ 〈y,y′〉 − 〈x,x′〉〈y′,y〉
mm′
≥ 0 .
Dividing by 2/mm′ and using 1/m2 + 1/(m′)2 ≥ 2/mm′, it is enough to show
1− 〈x,x′〉 − 〈y,y′〉 − 〈x,x′〉〈y′,y〉 ≥ 0 .
This factors as (1− 〈x,x′〉)(1 − 〈y,y′〉) ≥ 0 since we assumed x,x′,y,y′ were unit vectors.
Now we can apply Theorem 14 to see that with probability at least 1− exp(−u2),
sup
x,y
‖x‖2=‖y‖2=1
x⊤Ay
‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 ≤ C

 E
g∼N (0,I)
sup
x,y
‖x‖2=‖y‖2=1
〈(x,y),g〉
‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 + u


where C is a universal constant, g is a length 2n Gaussian vector with independent coordinates,
and we have used that ‖(x,y)‖2 ≤ ‖(x,y)‖1 = ‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1. To finish the argument, observe that
E
g∼N (0,I)
sup
x,y
‖x‖2=‖y‖2=1
〈(x,y),g〉
‖x‖1 + ‖y‖1 = Eg∼N (0,I)‖g‖∞ ≤ O(
√
log n) .
Finally, to prove the corollary, note that we just showed that with probability at least 1 −
exp(−u2), all x,y ∈ Rn with ‖x‖1 = ‖y‖1 = 1 have x⊤Ay/‖x‖2‖y‖2 ≤ O(
√
log n+ u) · (1/‖x‖2 +
1/‖y‖2). Multiplying by ‖x‖2‖y‖2 implies the corollary.
B Proof of Lemma 6
B.1 Facts about the binomial distribution
In our result, we need the following bound of Erdo˝s [Erd45].
Theorem 15 ([Erd45], variant of [Dzi14]). Let a1, . . . , an ≥ 1 be real numbers and ǫ1, . . . , ǫn be
Rademacher random variables (uniform distribution on {−1, 1}) then for all integers k ≥ 1,
Pr[a1ǫ1 + · · · anǫn ≥ k − 1] ≥ Pr[ǫ1 + · · ·+ ǫn ≥ k].
Furthermore, the following binomial inequality will be useful:
Lemma 16 ([Ash90]). For all k and n, (
n
k
)
≥ 2
nH(k/n)
√
8n
,
where H(·) is the binary entropy function.
Note that when k = n2 (1 + δ), then
H(k/n) := −1 + δ
2
log2(
1
2(1 + δ)) −
1− δ
2
log2(
1
2 (1− δ))
≥ 1− 1
ln 2
(
1 + δ
2
· δ + 1− δ
2
· (−δ)
)
= 1− (log2 e)δ2.
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Combining with the above inequality gives
1
2n
(
n
k
)
≥ 1√
8n
e−nδ
2
.
This allows us to show the following:
Claim 17. For all integers n ≥ k ≥ 0 with n sufficiently large
1
2n
n∑
i=n+k
2
(
n
i
)
≥ 1
10000
exp
(
−10k
2
n
)
. (10)
Proof. Note that here, δ = kn . If k ≥ n− 2
√
n, then
−10k2/n ≤ −10n + 40√n− 400 ≤ −9n
for n sufficiently large. Note that the LHS of 10 is at least 2−n > e−9n, and thus is at least the
RHS.
On the other hand, if k ≤ n−2√n, then by Lemma 16, the sum of the first √n terms is at least
√
n
(
n
n+k
2 +
√
n
)
≥ √n 1√
8n
exp
(
−n ·
(
k + 2
√
n
n
)2)
= 1√
8
exp
(
−k
2 + 4k
√
n+ 4n
n
)
≥ 1√
8
exp
(
−5k
2 + 5n
n
)
=
1
e5
√
8
exp
(
−5k
2
n
)
,
which implies the claim.
We recall here the statement of Lemma 6, and give a proof with the above results:
Lemma 6. Assume that X is the uniform distribution on {−1, 1} (i.e., the Rademacher distribu-
tion). There exists a universal constant c > 0 with the following property: For all x ∈ Rn such that
‖x‖1 = 1, with probability at least n−0.001 over v ∼ Xn
〈v,x〉 ≥ cβ(x).
Proof. Recall, we have defined the following: let L = ⌈log2 n/2100⌉. Let D = 22
500
and let
E1, . . . , EL be intervals such that Ei = (D
−i,D−(i−1)] for all i < L and EL = [0,D−(L−1)]. Let
x = x(1) + · · · + xL such that x(i)j = xj · 1[xj ∈ Ei]. We say x(i) is sparse if it has at most L
nonzero coordinates; otherwise it is dense. Let F ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , L} be the set of dense indices. Let
xsparse be the sum of the sparse x
(i)’s and xdense be the sum of the dense ones, and define
β(x) =
√
log n‖xdense‖2 + ‖xsparse‖1.
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Note that if we drop x(L), β changes by at most
√
log n‖x(L)‖1 ≤ n
√
log n·n−2400+1, a negligeably
small term. Thus, we can without loss of generality assume that x(L) = 0.
Since β(x) = ‖xsparse‖1 +
√
log n‖xdense‖2, we have for any x, at least one of ‖xsparse‖1
or
√
log n‖xdense‖2 is at least 12β(x). Assume we know that with probability at least 2n−0.001,
〈v,xsparse〉 = Ω(‖xsparse‖1); and with probability at least 2n−0.001, 〈v,xdense〉 = Ω(
√
log n‖xdense‖2).
Then, we know with probability at least n−0.001, one of 〈v,xsparse〉 and 〈v,xdense〉 is at least Ω(β(x))
and the other is at least 0 and thus their sum is at least β(x). We split the remainder of the proof
into two parts.
Part 1, 〈v,xsparse〉 = Ω(‖xsparse‖1)
Let x′ be the 2L largest coordinates of xsparse. Note that ‖x′‖1 is at least D2 times the sum of
the next 2L largest coordinates of xsparse and at least D
4 times the sum of the next 2L largest
coordinates after that, etc. Thus, ‖x′‖1 ≥ 12‖xsparse‖.
Now with probability 1/22L, because v has i.i.d. Rachemacher entries, 〈v,x′〉 = ‖x′‖1, and with
probability at least 1/2, 〈v,xsparse − x′〉 ≥ 0. Thus, with probability at least 1/22L+1 ≥ 2n−0.001,
〈v,xsparse〉 ≥ 12‖xsparse‖1.
Part 2, 〈v,xdense〉 = Ω(
√
log n‖xdense‖2)
Since xdense =
∑
i∈F x
(i), we have that
Pr
[
〈v,xdense〉 ≥
√
log n
1000D
‖xdense‖2
]
≥
∏
i∈F
Pr
[
〈v,x(i)〉 ≥
√
log n · ‖x(i)‖22
1000D‖xdense‖2
]
(11)
Consider i ∈ F , and let mi ≥ L+1 be the support size of x(i). Since x(i)j Di ≥ 1 for all j in the
support of x(i), we have by Theorem 15 and Claim 17, that for any integer k ∈ [0,mi]
Pr
[
〈v,x(i)〉 ≥ k
Di
]
≥
mi∑
i=
mi+k
2
+1
(
mi
i
)
≥ 1
10000
exp
(
−10mi
(
k + 2
mi
)2)
.
Observe that ‖x(i)‖2 ≤ √mi‖x(i)‖∞ ≤ √miD−(i−1). Thus,
Pr
[
〈v,x(i)〉 ≥ k
D
√
mi
‖x(i)‖2
]
≥ 1
10000
exp
(
−10mi
(
k + 2
mi
)2)
.
Let
k =
⌈
1
1000
√
mi log n · ‖x
(i)‖2
‖xdense‖2
⌉
.
Then, note that
k + 2
mi
≤ 3
mi
+
1
1000
√
log n
mi
· ‖x
(i)‖2
‖xdense‖2
Thus, since (a+ b)2 ≤ 2a2 + 2b2,
−10mi ·
(
k + 2
mi
)2
≥ −180
mi
− log n
5 · 104 ·
‖x(i)‖22
‖xdense‖22
.
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Therefore,
Pr
[
〈v,x(i)〉 ≥
√
log n
1000D
· ‖x
(i)‖22
‖xdense‖2
]
≥ 1
104
exp
(
−180
mi
− log n
5 · 104 ·
‖x(i)‖22
‖xdense‖22
)
.
Applying Eq. 11, and noting that each mi ≥ L ≥ |F |.
Pr
[
〈v,xdense〉 ≥
√
log n
1000D
‖xdense‖2
]
≥ 1
104L
exp
(
−
∑
i∈F
180
mi
− log n
5 · 104
)
=
1
104Le180
n−10
−5
≥ n−2−90n−10−5
≥ n−0.001,
For n sufficiently large. This concludes the proof.
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